Introduction
The heat generated by much of the literature concerning behaviour therapy re flects many things, not the least of which is the fact that authors are usually writing from particular theoretical positions, the validity of which they seem seldom to doubt. It may be a 'pure' behaviouristic position or a psychodynamic one, or it may be an equally ardent 'integrationist' attempting to dissolve the 'segregationist's' position. Thus the reader of psychiatric literature is faced with the task of evaluating positions which are frequently erudite and persuasively argued but which often seem to be dia metrically opposed.
A Hegelian approach might help. The task at hand is to understand both positions, and this should then lead to rejection of all partial views and to the acceptance of a new, broader view which would reconcile the original positions in a 'higher synthesis'. Some thoughts are presented here which might lead towards such a 'higher' synthesis or at least to an initial understanding.
A number of polarities have arisen with the coming to prominence of behaviour therapy, and three of these are considered here.
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Behaviourism versus Psychodj namics
Of the psychodynamic-behavioural pole mic, Wolberg has whimsically written, "In deed the most significant contributions that some of the warring members have made towards communicating interchanges have been the addition of some original offensive expletives to the contemporary vituperative lexicography." (20) He is no doubt refer ring to the stereotyped nature of the debate in which the arguments usually run some thing like this. The psychodynamicist (P-D) states that his theory is valid and his ap proach effective because his clinical experi ence tells him so. The behaviour therapist (B-T) accuses P-D of making 'ex cathedra' pronouncements, and rejects the validity of the psychodynamic approach because of the lack of experimental proof; only behaviour therapy is said to have given experimental proof of its effectiveness. P-D counters by pointing out that experimental findings in infrahuman species have no relevance to the complex human situation. B-T states that if one individual claims to effect a change on another this should be measur able, and insists that P-D come out from behind his couch and be measured. P-D points out that this immediately changes the patient-therapist relationship, and the numerous variables, such as warmth, em pathy, transference, and so on cannot be measured accurately anyway. B-T counters that if they cannot be measured they are probably mythical, in contrast to his learning theory which has proved highly measurable and relevant. P-D argues that the B-Ts only choose those conditions which fit their theory and ignore complex problems, such as depression, guilt, adolescent crisis, and so on, and so it goes.
Perhaps the fact that this debate can be caricatured means that it has all but burnt itself out. It is hard to imagine that the opponents in this piece are not aware of the need for a multiple model approach as well as scientific evaluation of all psycho therapy strategies. They must also be aware of the need to define operationally such terms as 'learning' (2), 'empathy' (18) and 'transference' (3), and it is useful to look at a few examples.
The Freudian explanation of 'specific phobias' seems unnecessarily complicated in suggesting that they inevitably are symp tomatic and symbolic of underlying uncons cious conflicts over sexual, aggressive or dependency needs, which have to be 'cured' before the subject can be relieved of his symptoms. Clearly the fact that thousands of people with phobias have obtained relief (without symptom substitution) from rela tively simple behaviour therapy techniques, based on the conditioned response theory, dictates a more parsimonious explanation. Or at least, if underlying conflicts are pre sent, they appear to be irrelevant to treat ment. Salzman has argued that cases with successful outcomes are not of patients with true phobias but with simple fears. Unfortunately, the difference between these is explained only in terms of postulated psychodynamics and not operationally (13) .
Yet while sometimes it seems necessary to abandon the psychoanalytic model, at other times it has been useful to retain it -even in behaviour therapy and even the old-fashioned hydrodynamic model. For example, in the aversion-relief therapy of homosexuals it is assumed that simple aversion to males will merely block sexual drive and create more problems -pos sibly other deviations -unless aversionrelief to females is provided. This clear ly implies that' a quantum of 'underlying' energy or drive is present, which if blocked at one point will emerge at another. This can also be expressed in terms of learn ing theory, as Maher (12) does when he talks about a repertoire of possible res ponses to a particular situation, some of them maladaptive and predominant (high probability) and others more adaptive but less dominant. Elimination of the maladap tive response must be accompanied by reinforcement of the less dominant adaptive response or a second, more dominant, mal adaptive response will occur. In effect, this is a very thinly disguised Freudian theory, as 'energy' and 'probability' appear here to be semantically equivalent.
There has been considerable recent criti cism (1, 6, 12) of the allegiance of clinical psychiatry to the disease model, but learning theory has also been criticized for being overly simplistic. Both arguments rely upon a naive view of the other position. Grinker (6) , for example, has pointed out the meaninglessness of the term 'medical model', emphasizing that the biopsychosocial field cannot be fractured into separate parts. Similarly, when dynamicists criticize learn ing models they usually think of them in simple, animal S-R conditioning terms, whereas social learning theorists now draw upon experimental evidence which includes a broad range of behavioural principles. Apart from the animal classical and instru mental conditioning models already men tioned, these include processes of imitation, modelling, vicarious learning and a variety of cognitive factors. As Lazarus has stated, only a small number of investigators such as "Eysenck and Wolpe and some doctri naire operant conditioners continue to es pouse rigid behaviouristic formulations of peripheral stimulus-response contingencies derived from infrahuman analogues." (7) Integration versus Segregation
In the last few years there has been an attempt to integrate the behavioural ap proach with psychodynamic psychotherapy. This has been resisted by both the 'pure' analysts and the 'pure' behaviourists, who feel that the capacity for further research is jeopardized by a forced amalgamation.
The integrationists have been of two kinds . the syncretists and the eclectics. The former attempt to identify and emphasize the common grounds of psychoanalytic and learning theories, and they point out that in effect both schools have been doing the same thing but using a different language. Dollard and Miller's attempt to describe analytic concepts in learning theory terms is an early example of this (4). Sloane's paper "The converging paths of behaviour therapy and psychotherapy" would appear to be a more recent example (15) . Dol lard and Miller's attempt, interesting as it was, failed to generate much applica tion or research and seemed to offer a dictionary of synonyms rather than any significant theoretical breakthrough.
On the other hand, the eclectic approach recognizes that there are significant theore tical and practical differences between psy chodynamic and behavioural therapies and that these should be emphasized; both ap proaches may be fruitful, and the ideal therapy will contain the best from both, depending upon the needs of the patient. The leading spokesman for this approach is Arnold Lazarus (8, 9) who, along with many others, has pointed to the failure of psychoanalysis to produce testable hypo theses and also the subsequent arbitrariness and abstruseness of many of the analytic formulations. Yet he has also emphasized the naivety of those who would see psycho therapy exclusively in terms of 'modern learning theory'. It is well known that learn ing theories of the Pavlov-Thorndike-Hull variety are derived from animal studies and that the extrapolations to humans, capable of a wider variety of responses including language and imagery, are often unjustified. These theories may provide a basis for research, but as total explanations they do not match the formulations derived from traditional methods of psychotherapy which have tried to encompass the complexities of human behaviour. For Lazarus, ". . . behaviour therapy is best described as a clinical undertaking which adds a series of specific techniques and operations (preferably derived from experimental psychology, and certainly couched within a broadly behavioural framework) to those empirically validated procedures which have been part of tradi tional psychotherapeutics used for decades." (10) Eysenck, the leading behaviourist segre gationist, has called Lazarus' eclectic ap proach, ". . . nothing but a mishmash of theories, a huggermugger of procedures, a gallemaufry of therapies and a charivaria of activities having no proper rationale and incapable of being tested or evaluated. What is needed in science and in medicine are clear-cut theories leading to specific pro cedures which are applicable to specific types of patients; such procedures should be capable of being taught and should also be strictly evaluated for cost-effectiveness. Fur thermore, they should be under constant critical scrutiny from the theoretical point of view." (5) In fact they are both correct in part. Re search should only be conducted when spe cific procedures are applied to specific types of patients in certain situations. Strupp and Bergin, in their review of psychotherapy research, stressed the recent emphasis on this in current studies (16). (Of course, this research need not be limited to learning theory; in fact, in the article quoted above, Eysenck acknowledges the work of Truax and Charkhuff (18) on personality factors in the therapists.) However, although the drive towards purity in research must con tinue (in the sense of the isolation of vari ables) the clinical situation can never be a 'pure' situation and therefore eclecticism is thoroughly justified in Lazarus' sense. In addition clinical demands cannot be held at bay until research catches up. The com bining of experimentally proven and em pirically sound techniques seems logical and there would appear to be no reason why such combinations of treatment techniques could not be subject to continued research. It is worth noting that it was a strange kind of scientific purism that disallowed direct use of experiential data which proved self-defeating in the history of behaviour ism. With some exceptions, a similar type of isolation and negation of experimental data has caused psychoanalysis to organize itself into a self-destructive posture (6) .
Autonomy versus Control
The ethical concerns raised by the intro duction of behaviour therapy have sparked a rekindling of the ancient free-will versus determinism debate. The practitioner is now faced with another issue -to what extent is the patient free to choose and, if he finds it necessary, to reject the therapist's intru sions; or is behaviour determined totally from without, and therefore must be sub ject to considerable control by the thera pist?
The psychoanalyst claims that he assists the patient to free himself of unconscious conflicting forces which interfere with per sonal growth and maturation. The mature individual then is one who is freer to choose his own destiny in a rational way. In the humanistic psychology movement (Maslow, Rogers) the therapist is even less intrusive, reflecting and clarifying the patient's thoughts in an atmosphere of warmth and positive regard, so that the patient's selfactualizing force may assert itself. Here the autonomy of the patient is emphasized throughout, and the persuasion factor is thought to be insignificant compared with the patient's ability to make meaningful choices.
In sharp contrast to this is Skinner's be lief that autonomy in this sense is mythical and that all behaviour has its contingencies, many of which are as yet unidentified (14) . Therefore the therapist should accept the position of a controller who chooses the proper contingencies for the patient in order to produce the desired behaviour. With the current growth of an antipsychiatry atmos phere in the popular literature (Laing, Szasz, et al), among youth and even in universities this question has more than just academic interest.
There is now increasing awareness of the importance of subtle forms of persuasion, therapists' sets, expectations, reinforcements and therapist values in therapy, even client-centered therapy, as Truax, a former stu dent of Rogers, has shown (19) .
Reviewing the controversy between mani pulation versus self-actualization, Strupp and Bergin (17) state, "There can be little doubt that research in the field as a whole has been veering in the direction espoused by Skinner." They point out that the assump tion that the patient possesses the 'correct', therapeutically desirable response within his repertoire may be true of, ". . . inhibited upper middle-class neurotic patients, who are reasonably well functioning" but this is probably not the case with the large num ber of personality problems seen by thera pists today. These authors state that, "More typical are those patients whose personality development has left them with pronounced deficits in adequate prosocial responses and behaviours." And their reading of the ac cumulated evidence suggested that ". . . all forms of psychotherapy exert 'planfuF psy chological influence and they are therefore manipulative in the sense of utilizing prin ciples of social control."
The conclusions here would seem to be that the image of the therapist as enhancer of a self-actualizing 'good' tendency in the patient is unrealistic. The therapist will have to accept the full responsibility for his role as social educator, awesome as this might seem. Assurances of benevolence in the 'controller' are no more guaranteed in psy chiatry than they are in surgery or educa tion, where they are equally desired. Whether a physician is best equipped to assume this role is an interesting follow-up to this point but one which is beyond the scope of this presentation. Suffice it to say that in the near future society as a whole will have more to say about who should assume this role.
Summary
In the literature dealing with the relation ship of behavioural therapy to other forms of psychotherapy the psychiatric practitioner is faced with a number of apparently dichotomous positions. The general psychi atrist whose practice usually calls for an eclectic approach has to come to terms with these apparently antithetical approaches. With this in mind, three different but re lated polarities are discussed -behav iourism versus psychodynamics; integration versus segregation; and autonomy versus control.
